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 EXECUTIVE SUMMARY 
 
The weak democratic systems that followed decades of 
military dictatorships in Latin America coupled with the 
emergence of new authoritarian regimes of the left have had 
a significant impact on the relationship between the 
governments and the media. The new populist leaders have 
challenged the media that have generally reflected the 
perspectives of the traditional elites.  This ideological clash 
has renewed direct and indirect censorship, curtailing 
freedom of expression and thus, freedom of the press.  
 
In this context, this paper discusses the mechanisms used by 
Latin American governments, particularly the new 
authoritarianism of the left, to silence dissident voices.  
Many of these mechanisms are legal, found in laws related to 
personal injury and defamation.   Others have been of a 
constitutional nature, invoking states of emergency or 
national security concerns.  Some governments have used 
institutional means to close down newspapers and other 
sources of information.  
 
Current media conditions in Latin America show growing 
polarization.  This has led to considerable levels of violence 
and intimidation against editors, journalists, and news crews 
in several countries.  It is precisely this type of deterioration 
of fundamental rights that leads to questioning the strength 
and sustainability of Latin American democracies.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 1
2 
 
INTRODUCTION  
 
Latin America is undergoing one of the most dramatic 
periods in recent history. After decades of dictatorship, 
turbulent economic crisis and the emergence of new actors in 
the political scene, the region‘s democracies are still far from 
consolidated. A report from the United Nations Development 
Program suggests that democracy in the region has failed to 
live up to the expectations of millions in the region.
1
 To 
make matters worse, the military arguably continue to hold 
influence among democratically-elected governments across 
the region,
2
 while the legitimacy of traditional democratic 
institutions have eroded over the past few years, limiting 
their ability to deploy authority and mobilize the public 
towards common goals of society. This is truer in the case of 
traditional political parties, which have lost important ground 
among their constituencies; making voters far more 
pragmatic in their choices.
3
 This pragmatism and the 
unresolved issue of socio-economic disparities have 
facilitated the emergence of populist leaders who stand for 
wealth re-distribution while challenging traditional elites. 
Indeed, the end of the 1990s witnessed the rise of left-wing 
governments in Latin America. Hugo Chávez in Venezuela, 
Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva in Brazil, Néstor Kirchner in 
Argentina, -- Correa in Ecuador, and Evo Morales in Bolivia 
were prominent among those who swept into power in this 
scenario of anti-politics. 
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It is in this context that the media has played an increasingly 
important role in defending the former status of power. From 
the start, the newly elected left-wing leaders encountered a 
media landscape where ownership was highly concentrated 
in a few hands and where the mainstream and privately-
owned commercial media exerted a forceful opposition 
towards governments and policies aimed at promoting wealth 
re-distribution. Evidence of this can be seen in the active role 
played by the news media in the rapid overthrow of President 
Hugo Chavez in April 2002
4
 and the subsequent antagonistic 
relations with the governments of Argentina, Brazil, Bolivia, 
Ecuador and Nicaragua, among others.  
 
In return, governments have responded by enacting and 
modifying legislation regarding news media ownership. In 
some cases, these governments have gone as far as 
nationalizing existing media outlets while creating new ones 
in order to challenge prevalent accounts of events while 
counter-mobilizing public opinion.  Still in others, there have 
been direct intimidation and attacks against the media.  In 
Honduras, for example, there are reports of more than 300 
documented attacks against the media in 2009. It is within 
these scenarios of confrontational and polarized politics that 
censorship, self-censorship, pressures and threats against 
journalists have become once again rife across Latin 
America.  
 
This article examines the current threats and challenges 
polarization poses for the democratic stability of the 
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continent. As these governments face up limitations of power 
in their ability to satisfy the demands for a better allocation 
of resources; confrontation and polarization between these 
governments and the commercially owned media are 
expected to grow stronger.  The reaction from these 
governments to the threats posed by the media has in some 
cases already undertaken semi-authoritarian positions; which 
are unique to left-wing governments in the region.  
 
BACK TO THE FUTURE 
 
Thirty years ago only a handful of countries in Latin America 
had democratic regimes in which different political parties 
alternated into power.
5
 Today, all countries —with the 
exception of Cuba— have some sort of a multi-party 
electoral system. Official censors from the past military 
regimes have been formally removed from the newsrooms 
across the region and most of the new constitutions in these 
countries explicitly guarantee freedom of speech. However, 
democracy has brought different degrees of tolerance 
towards the role of the media and the work of journalists.  In 
many cases the newly found freedom of the media has come 
with strings attached; meaning formal and informal 
mechanisms of control.  
 
Formal constrains on the media have included not only laws 
and regulations that date back to the fall of the military 
regimes, but also recent legislation on media ownership, 
access to broadcast airwaves, and proposed discretionary 
powers to regulate what people may or may not see from 
satellite channels and the Internet.  Mechanisms of informal 
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control include indirect censorship and self-censorship, 
which became more explicit and widely used by left-wing 
leaders in the late 1990‘s, especially after realizing that the 
privately owned commercial media was being used to 
mobilize the public against the re-distributive agendas of 
these governments. However, it is not these mechanisms of 
control that hinders the ability of the news media and 
journalists to express their views freely, but instead the 
profound polarization of political and ideological views 
derived from the confrontation for the control of resources. 
In doing so, pro-government and anti-government media 
outlets have become a praetorian guard of the main interests 
they represent and have effectively blocked not only opposite 
views, but those that represent alternatives to both sides. The 
result is a false dichotomy in which neither side admits 
criticism, nor values the democratic debate and political 
plurality.  
 
THE MEDIA IN TRANSITION  
 
In most cases, the media outlets in Latin America went from 
being a subordinate appendix of the military dictatorships, 
constrained by direct censorship, to become quasi-
autonomous agents of political control during democracy, in 
its way serving the interest of the new ruling elites. Since 
then, they have participated ―in the transaction of power 
while structuring the political positions of the different 
agents.‖6 It was a scheme in which media outlets were 
allowed to act as watchdogs but within a set of boundaries, 
which included institutional support for liberal democracy 
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and informal arrangements with the political and economic 
elites.
7
 
 
If indeed the constitutional framework did guarantee freedom 
of expression, it did so under specific limits established by 
law. These limits included harsh anti-defamation laws and 
severe restrictions to what could be covered by news crews. 
Among them, the case of the temporary suspension of 
constitutional guarantees by the executive branch, when 
declaring states of emergency or invoking national security 
concerns as a way of imposing a de facto injunction over 
what could be published or broadcast. Overall, democratic 
governments are not exempt of committing these sins. Most 
of them, with a few exceptions, have exercised, in one way 
or another, censorship. Furthermore, Colombia, Guatemala, 
Honduras, Mexico and Peru have a terrible track record of 
human rights abuses against editors and journalists, as well 
as impunity of the perpetrators.  Forcible disappearance and 
assassination of news casts is still common in the region.  
 
Other indirect means of censorship include: libel actions 
against media outlets and journalists; direct violence against 
them; and, practices of self-censorship among editors and 
news media owners due to intimidation or financial pressure. 
More recently, editors and journalists have been persecuted 
and imprisoned using a string of supposedly unrelated 
accusations that go from alleged embezzlement ―as in the 
case of Eladio Muchacho from Diario de Los Andes in 
Venezuela― to accusations of illegal adoption of children 
from those forcibly disappeared during the military juntas 
―as in the case of Marcela and Felipe Noble Herrera ―co-
owners of El Clarin in Argentina. 
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Other types of constraints derive from economic pressures. 
On the one hand, media ownership in the region is not only 
highly concentrated but closely linked to traditional political 
and economic elites with renewed corporative interests. 
Journalists in places such as Uruguay and Costa Rica have 
often bowed to pressures from media owners who usually 
indicate what can or cannot be reported. On the other hand, 
the State is still a key element with regards to media reform
8
 
and funding, as it provides a substantial amount of 
advertising revenue. Within these boundaries for media 
freedom, journalists and news media in general could 
criticize governments and politicians and carry out 
investigative reporting, while producing media campaigns in 
favor or against topical issues. These boundaries, however, 
rarely allow for the coverage of inequality as a news topic; at 
least not in a systematic manner. 
 
A SECOND TRANSITION  
 
The arrival of new left-wing leaders to power marked the 
beginning of a profound transformation of the relationship 
between the media and the government. The mainstream 
media rapidly became not only a confrontational actor, but a 
major antagonist player able to organize, agglutinate and 
mobilize the opposition.
9
 In many ways the 2002 brief 
overthrow of Chávez was ―a mediated coup,‖10 which 
brought extraordinary consequences to the future of the 
private media-government relations, not only in Venezuela 
but also across the continent. As some have suggested, ―The 
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private mainstream media still owes the Venezuelan society a 
good explanation about their reprehensible behavior during 
those years.‖11  
 
Since then, the Venezuelan government has been far more 
aggressive in pushing its own media agenda, promoting 
community broadcast media to resist the growing criticism of 
private media sectors, while accelerating the introduction of 
a new legislation on broadcast that gives the government 
more discretionary power and control over it. As a result, the 
Ley de Responsabilidad Social en Radio y Televisión 
―approved on December 2004― has been fundamental to 
dissuade most of the broadcast media of taking a critical 
stance. This was achieved through the enforcement of a hard 
set of sanctions ―from heavy fines to revocation of 
licenses― that have been applied over 200 radio and 
television stations. Since then, experts and non-governmental 
organizations have agreed that this legislation has been 
effective in bringing out self-censorship.
12
  
 
Another important measure taken by the Venezuelan 
administration was the decision to take off the air the 
terrestrial signal of Radio Caracas Televisión (RCTV) ―one 
of the two main Venezuelan television networks. To some, 
this responded to a premeditated strategy by the government 
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of President Hugo Chávez to replace the hegemony of 
private broadcasters with a state-dominated and a state-
influenced media.
13
 A study performed by Bernardino 
Herrera ―from the Instituto de Investigaciones de la 
Comunicación of the Universidad Central de Venezuela 
(ININCO-UCV) ― suggests that 70 percent of the programs 
aired by the main state-owned television network (VTV) and 
TEVES (which took over the airwaves from RCTV) 
contained pro-government propaganda, biased information, 
and repetitions of President Chávez‘s addresses in television 
and radio.
14
  
 
The steps taken by the Venezuelan government were quickly 
followed by Argentina, Bolivia and Ecuador, where there 
were clear ideological links to Venezuela. However, soon 
after, similar types of legislation appeared in Mexico and 
Honduras. Right after the coup, tensions between the 
government of Honduras and the media outlets were also 
very high. A draconian anti-terrorist law ―which severely 
undermined freedom of speech― was passed by Congress 
behind closed doors in a session to which news media were 
denied access. Indeed, the use of legislative powers to 
undermine the ability of the media to provide critical 
reporting has become a widespread governmental practice in 
many countries. 
 
When Ecuador declared a state of emergency on September 
2010, as protests by police and some members of the military 
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led to nationwide unrest, the accusations of a coup d'état 
came from the government. Critics of President Rafael 
Correa, however, said he had exaggerated by calling it a coup 
attempt. Rubén Darío Buitrón, news editor of El Comercio, 
the leading Quito newspaper, said that no coup was under 
way and that the government was spinning the protests in 
order to gain political support. 
 
It is a media show and things have been 
exaggerated by the government in order to 
make it look like a victim," he said, adding that 
the problems had originated from low-ranking 
officers, not from any group of military 
generals wishing to take control.
15
 
 
According to a study from the NGO Fundamedios in 
Ecuador, between 2007 and 2011, the government filed more 
than 18 lawsuits against media editors and journalists. This 
could potentially pose a liability of millions of US dollars 
and lead to the bankruptcy of many of the mainstream media 
outlets. There is a well-documented case of journalists Juan 
Carlos Calderón and Christian Zurita, who were sued by 
President Correa for over US$10 million dollars for their 
book ―El Gran Hermano,‖ (The Great Brother) which alleged 
links of President Correa‘s brother with private corporations 
that were undertaking government contracts. Other cases 
include those of journalists Emilio Palacio, Francisco 
Vivanco and José Acacho, all of whom have been threatened 
with prison sentences and large civil suits. 
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In Bolivia, political events have led to the promotion of new 
legislation that limits the ability of journalists and the media 
to cover certain issues. Indeed, fears of separatist movements 
have led to greater control of the media, while a new and 
wide supported anti-racist legislation has included articles 
that grant discretionary powers to the government while 
posing a potential threat against the freedom of the media.  
 
Opposition leaders and some of the mainstream media outlets 
of Santa Cruz and Cochabamba ―regions rich in natural 
resources― have been accused of promoting national 
separatism with the intention of weakening President Evo 
Morales‘ government. Indeed, separatism in Bolivia has 
often been associated with white and rich land ownership, as 
in the case of the US-born rancher Ronald Larsen, who has 
openly opposed the Morales' administration. Followers of 
President Morales have accused the media of supporting 
these movements and of putting in jeopardy the national 
unity. 
  
Equally critical has been the proposal for a new law on 
racism. The Episcopal Conference of the Catholic Church in 
Bolivia (CEB) warned that if changes were not made to the 
draft law against racism, led by President Morales, there 
could be a serious danger of undermining freedom of 
expression. The Secretary General of the CEB, Oscar 
Aparicio, pointed out that if some of the passages in this 
project remain in the final bill, democratic exercise of 
freedom of expression could disappear altogether. These 
parts of the bill have also been rejected by several institutions 
such as the media associations, federations, and unions of 
journalists in that country. The law provides economic 
sanctions and authorizes the Executive branch to close any 
media that publishes or broadcasts any content considered 
racist or discriminatory. Needless to say that the wording is 
12 
 
in some cases is vague and left to discretionary interpretation 
by the authorities. 
 
It is possible to suggest that some of these governments are 
using perfectly legitimate causes to push for media laws that 
limit ―or could potentially limit― the freedom of 
expression as they provide wider discretionary powers to the 
Executive ―making it more difficult for journalists and 
media owners to challenge the former. In Nicaragua, for 
instance, the Congress passed a bill that criminalized 
violence against women and established sanctions against 
media that satirized female politicians. This has effectively 
kept some cartoonists from drawing and criticizing the first 
lady.  
 
DECONSTRUCTING POLARIZED VIOLENCE 
 
Another key exercise of indirect censorship is the 
orchestrated violence against media in general, particularly 
journalists and news workers. According to the Venezuelan 
NGO Espacio Público, in 2008 there were 186 cases of 
violations affecting journalists and media outlets, mostly 
assaults, intimidation, and threats; one journalist was killed.   
In 2009, another NGO, the Instituto Prensa y Sociedad, 
reported two journalists killed, about 20 harmed, and more 
than 200 cases of aggressions against reporters, between 
print and broadcast media outlets in Venezuela alone. In 
other places such as Colombia and Mexico, journalism has 
become indeed one of the most dangerous and deadly 
professions.  However, violence also extends to the media 
outlet itself.  In 2002 the main offices of El Nacional were 
surrounded by pro-government sympathizers, minutes after 
13 
 
President Chávez had made harsh critics on national 
television against the newspaper.
16
  
 
Also, there have been several violent acts against television 
networks such as Globovision. Explosive devices have been 
thrown at the station in daylight and many reporters and 
photographers have been attacked by pro-government 
supporters as well as by both the police and the armed forces. 
Indeed, it is the State‘s responsibility to control violence and 
guarantee the safety of journalists, even if the attacks come 
from third parties.  
 
Violence, however, has not been an exclusive issue of pro-
government sectors. Many in the opposition in Venezuela 
have orchestrated violence against pro-government media 
and media workers, while trying to cover news from the 
opposition. This situation has been replicated in places such 
as Bolivia and Ecuador, but to a much lesser extent. Some 
authors believe that there are structural reasons as to why 
violence against journalists and news crews is becoming 
endemic. They point out that this is a reflection upon the 
fragility of democracy in some Latin American countries, 
which translates into increasing violence against press 
workers.
17
 Colombia alone has the macabre Latin America‘s 
record of more journalists killed in the continent,
18
 while 
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places such as Mexico follow dead close. Because of this, the 
phenomenon of orchestrated and spontaneous violence 
against reporters and news teams needs to be analyzed in a 
wider setting that focuses not only on how the news are 
controlled and censored, but also on how impunity affects 
media freedom.  
 
Previous research carried out in other societies suggests that 
when journalists‘ safety is seriously compromised, news 
crews either stop or limit their coverage.
19
 If the need of 
coverage relates to political or economic interests of the 
media organizations, and if these interests are greater than 
the risk of getting journalists killed or harmed, journalists 
and news crews have to become ‗embedded‘ with one of the 
parts; despite the detriment of their ability to be critical and 
independent.  
 
This is exactly what is happening in Colombia, Ecuador and 
Venezuela, where journalists and their news crews remain 
behind friendly lines in order to guarantee their own safety. 
By doing so, journalists and reporters become embedded in 
each side of the political spectrum, therefore reinforcing 
prevalent views within their core audiences. This only 
increases polarization, while making normal mechanisms of 
self criticism and dialogue dysfunctional.  
 
It is true that media polarization in Latin America is not a 
new phenomenon. Historically newspapers and broadcasters 
were divided between pro-government and pro-opposition 
media, with little or no space whatsoever for alternative 
views. Even during the 1930s and the 1940s, the newspapers 
of the time did not publish the names of the candidates that 
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did not represent their interests.
20
  Indeed, as some argue, 
polarization has been a sustained trend and feature of modern 
Latin America.
21
 
 
However, what it is relatively new is the degree of violent 
confrontation and exclusion within this process of 
polarization. In 2007, a report from the Human Rights Watch 
(HRW) in Venezuela identified 47 aggressions against 
journalists. In the year 2008, the number of aggressions had 
gone to over 60 according to the same report.
22
 Similar 
tendencies can now be found in places such as Bolivia and 
Ecuador, where violence against media presents itself in 
verbal and physical forms. In places such as Colombia, 
Mexico and Peru, violence against journalists and subsequent 
impunity of the perpetrators is widespread. Nowadays, 
journalists find themselves under the same threats that 
judges, prosecutors, union leaders and human rights activists, 
but in most cases without the legal or police protection that 
some of the former enjoy when carrying out their functions. 
 
Under these circumstances, journalists are compelled to 
report only from safe intellectual and physical zones, in order 
to reassure their status as gatekeepers of their constituencies. 
They know that the fundamental nature of polarization is 
violence; which is not only a manifestation of a pre-existing 
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antagonism, but a mean to keep that same antagonism in 
place ―crucial to reinforce political identity and ideology.  
In doing so, subjective violence in face of polarization is 
pivotal to manage indirect censorship. A few journalists are 
able to reach objectivity despite the heavy baggage and 
pressures that sometimes make it almost impossible to 
provide a fair account of events.  
 
Journalists from both sides acknowledge the problems they 
face when bringing back accounts that do not represent the 
mainstream views within their own newsrooms. They say 
that it is even more problematic to bring back political stories 
that do not fit either views of ―goodies and baddies.‖ 
According to Gabriela Pedrozo an investigative reporter for 
Globovision, for more than a decade,  
 
To work in that network has become a life 
experience; now we have to wear a bulletproof 
vest to go on the streets. We receive training on 
how to use gas masks. Globovision has been 
accused by the government of promoting 
“media terrorism” and of “poisoning the 
minds of the public.
23
 
 
Pedrozo instead blames the government for the increasing 
violence against journalists and underlines the limited access 
journalists have to government sources.
24
 This complaint is 
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also shared by others such as Luis Pérez from La Verdad 
Daily in Venezuela: 
  
Not only we do not get invited to press 
conferences or events, but moreover if we 
manage to get there, we are denied access by 
the authorities and security services.
25
  
 
Pérez‘s views are shared by other journalists working in what 
the government supporters describe as ―opposition media 
outlets.‖26  
 
The situation seems to have deteriorated in the past ten years. 
Traditionally, political leadership had accepted, with 
reticence, the democratic and critical role of journalists and 
media outlets; viewing news editors and journalists as 
political adversaries, who would, nevertheless, play along the 
wider ground rules of the system. However, this is no longer 
the case in some of the new regimes. The new left-wing 
political elites see journalists instead as ideological enemies 
who are willing to bring them down from power in what is 
perceived to be a class struggle.  
 
Even though certain degree of polarization is healthy for 
public debate and confrontation of political ideas, the 
polarization of the media in many Latin American countries 
has become an end in itself for censorship, which often spills 
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into violence or threats of violence. Madeline García, who 
works for the State-owned international broadcaster TeleSur 
and who formally worked with the privately owned Televen 
during the events of 2002 in Venezuela, argues that violence 
comes from both sides. This position is also supported by 
pro-government journalists across the continent. However, it 
is the government the ultimate responsible for the security 
and well-being of journalists and reporters from all sides.  
Peruvian and journalists Carlos Ganoza, argues, 
 
One might even suggest that the current 
antagonism between the media and the left-
wing governments is a radical manifestation of 
a greater framework of polarized politics in 
which these countries have been crudely 
divided between those who are in favor and 
against the new left-wing paradigm. 
27
 
 
However, audiences are crude social constructions and as 
such, they do not entirely reflect the more complex and 
interlinked set of realities that define how certain issues will 
be covered. Therefore, as news is directed towards these 
audiences, they resent the issues as simplistic caricatures that 
serve well the ability to hold on to specific audiences by 
reinforcing their pre-conceptions and world-views.  
 
POLARIZED DANGERS  
 
The use of indirect mechanisms of censorship is not 
exclusive to Latin America or even to the developing 
countries. The use of injunctions and threats of libel actions 
to keep the media at bay is now widespread in the U.S. and 
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Great Britain.
28
 More recently, a group of young Muslims in 
the UK were detained by the police and taken to court under 
the Anti-Terrorist Act for showing banners against British 
soldiers returning from Afghanistan.
29
 Paradoxically, the 
slogans in the banners were very similar if not almost 
identical to those used in the anti-Vietnam war protests and 
in the 1960s‘ anti-apartheid movement.  
 
The use of violence against the media, journalists and news 
crews is still ―sadly― a recurrent and widely spread 
practice in our times. Violence against journalists is 
deliberately used by governments to limit their independent 
assessment of the events and to push for ―embedded 
journalism.‖ Indeed, journalists from both developing 
countries and industrialized nations are constantly 
threatened, harmed and killed while pursuing their stories 
with the sole intention of silencing dissident voices.
30
  
 
In Latin America, polarization provides a framework that 
legitimizes censorship and makes it not only acceptable but 
also arguably desirable for the public. Because of 
polarization, the public sphere and the elements that nurture a 
healthy political debate in Latin America are partitioned in 
opposing mirrors that reflect almost unrecognizable 
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caricatures of the same events and issues. Indeed, in Latin 
America, the media landscape is now dominated either by 
official media ―usually used as propaganda in the context of 
re-distributive policies― or by corporative media owned by 
a few who try to hold on to their traditional privileges. This 
dichotomy is expressed in a deeply polarized environment in 
which both sides are fervently trying to establish their own 
hegemony in airwaves. This has become a common practice 
in places such as Argentina, Bolivia, Ecuador and Venezuela, 
where presidents not only have weekly programs, but also 
almost unlimited access to the airwaves.  
 
One of the most worrisome features is that this situation 
seems to be widely accepted not only by those who gather 
and disseminate the news, but also by the public who 
consumes them.  Most surveys in the region suggest that with 
a few exceptions, those media outlets that adopt impartial 
views tend to suffer in terms of ratings and sales.
31
 Similar 
surveys and market research suggest that in some places 
polarization has been more accepted as 'normal'. In 
Argentina, Bolivia, and Ecuador, the public has become 
radicalized in reading, listening and watching only the media 
outlets that reflect their own political preferences, since they 
seem to provide a legitimate version of events.  
 
Regrettably one must conclude that the formerly held notion 
of an impartial and somehow balanced media, even if it is 
just a utopian aspiration, has ceased to be the right choice for 
many. If one is to believe the media sales figures and ratings 
from different media outlets, people in Latin America seem 
to want either a completely depoliticized media full of 
infotainment or a news media politically charged with 
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propaganda from either side. It is a dire scenario in which 
audiences tend to tune only to what reinforces their own 
political identity, or even worse, not to tune anything at all.  
 
Also, the radicals from both sides seem very happy to see 
their own political views uncritically reflected in their media 
coverage, even if this means omitting facts and censoring 
voices that challenge prevalent views. Some authors have 
observed how this polarized coverage tends to operate by 
providing or undermining legitimacy to the opposing 
narratives.  
 
At the core of this system of censorship and self-censorship, 
as we have discussed it earlier, extreme polarization 
translates into violence. Paraphrasing Žižek32, this is a type 
of systemic violence that is not perceivable to many, but 
upon which systems of power depend. This violence against 
opposite views is virulent, oppressing and blinding, but 
equally silent and intangible. It is pure terror ―hence why 
many are now using the term ―media terrorism.‖33 In this 
framework, the media is vociferous in attacking the ―other‖, 
as well as fearful of reflecting self-criticism or perspectives 
that do not exhibit those of their political masters. 
 
Behind all this, there is a mechanism to award legitimacy by 
polarization. Indeed, by making journalists, editors, news 
media and sources take sides and embrace extreme positions, 
the framework of polarization not only limits the scope of 
what can and cannot be reported but also makes almost 
                                                             
32
 Salvo Žižek, Violence (London: Profile Books, 2008) 8. 
33
 D. Garcia, Tres visiones sobre el terrorismo mediático, Ministerio del 
Poder Popular para la Comunicación y la Información, 02 April 2008. 
 
http://www.minci.gob.ve/reportajes/2/176222/tresisiones_sobre_elterroris
mo.html. Accessed on December 4, 2010. 
22 
 
invisible the positions, views and voices from the opposition 
and from those outside the polarized spectrum. In doing so, 
this framework erases the spaces for opposite and alternative 
views, thus reinforcing polarization and its violent 
manifestations.  
 
The problems of an explicitly biased coverage (such as 
democratic deficit) are overwhelmingly eclipsed by the 
ability to turn segmented audiences into commodities. 
Hence, pro-left and anti-left media saturate their narratives 
with exaggerated versions of their own realities, which are 
impossible to corroborate in a context of polarized politics 
where one side of the society does not literally speak to the 
other. In simple words, doing propaganda instead of 
journalism tends to pay off in the short term for both sides. 
 
In this context, polarization is not only the amalgamation of 
complex views and voices in clear-cut but unrealistic 
political blocks, but also a way to keep audiences captive of 
elite interests. If indeed these interests do represent 
distinctive understandings of society (social rights against 
liberal rights), these are far from comprehensive and by no 
means represent the realities and issues that news media and 
journalists should be covering and disseminating. As each 
side only speaks to those of their own kind, the consequence 
is obvious; democratic debate and self-criticism ceases to 
exist as such, and explicit violence inevitably follows. 
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